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from statutory descent restrictions on homestead. 84 Finally, by not requiring
joinder, the court would align case law with the manifest intent of the legislature regarding homestead alienation restrictions8s
DARRYL RICHARDS

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE FIFTH CIRCUIT'S
"GOOD FAITH" EXCEPTION TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
WELL-REACHED OR OVERREACHED?

-

United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980).
Defendant Williams had been convicted for possession of heroin in
March, 1977 after an arrest by a federal Drug Enforcement Administration
agent.' Pending appeal, 2 she was freed on bond on the condition that she
remain in Ohio.2 In November, 1977, the agent who had arrested the defendant and who knew of the bond restriction 4 recognized her in the Atlanta
airport. She was deplaning from a Los Angeles flight 5 and preparing to depart
for Lexington, Kentucky. 6 Acting in the good faith belief that he was
authorized, the agent arrested the defendant without a warrant for violation
of her travel restriction.7 Heroin found in a search pursuant to the arrest
84. As joinder in an interspousal conveyance does not affect its homestead status, see note
77 supra, there is no reason to restrict alienation.
85. The policy of the constitution's alienation provision was protection of the wife; they
were not intended to obstruct a conveyance of the homestead to her. See generally Shapo,
note 9 supra.
1. 622 F.2d 830, 833 (5th Cir. 1980). Defendant Jo Ann Williams was arrested by Drug
Enforcement Administration Special Agent Paul J. Markonni in Toledo, Ohio in June 1976
for possession of heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. §841(a)(1) (1976). The District Court for
the Northern District of Ohio denied defendant's motion to suppress evidence of the heroin.
Id.
2. Id. The appeal was of the denial of defendant's motion to suppress, which was ultimately affirmed by the Sixth Circuit. United States v. Williams, 573 F.2d 1312 (6th Cir. 1977).
3. 622 F.2d at 833. Release on bond pending appeal is authorized by 18 U.S.C. §3148
(1976) which provides that a person who appeals a conviction will be treated in accordance
with §3146 unless the judicial officer believes that despite the conditions of release which
may be imposed the person released may flee or pose a danger to the community. 18 U.S.C.
§3146(a)(2) (1976) provides that a judicial officer may "place restrictions on the travel, association, or place of abode of the person during the period of release .... 622 F:2d at 830, 833
n.4.
4. 622 F.2d at 834 n.5. Agent Markonni had been informed of the travel restrictions by an
Assistant United States Attorney for the Northern District of Ohio.
5. Id. at 834 n.8. Agent Markonni knew that Los Angeles was the source city of the
heroin involved in Williams' March 1977 conviction.
6. Id. at 834. The agent also asked defendant Williams whether she had permission to
travel outside of Ohio. The defendant responded, "No. this is the first time." When asked
why she was going to Lexington, the defendant responded, "I live there now."
7. Id. at 835. The arrest power of DEA agents is described in 21 U.S.C. §878(3) (1976):
"Any officer or employee of the Drug Enforcement Administration designated by the
Attorney General may . . . (3) make arrests without warrant (A) for any offense against
the United States committed in his presence, or (B) for any felony, cognizable under the
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led to an indictment for possession of a controlled substance., Upon defendant's
motion,9 the district court suppressed the evidence resulting from the arrest. A
panel majority of the Fifth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that violation of a bond
condition was not a criminal offense, and thus a warrantless arrest could not
be made.10 On rehearing en banc the Fifth Circuit reversed and HELD, the
defendant was legally arrested for breach of court-imposed travel restrictions;
and, whether or not the arrest was legal,' 2 the exclusionary rule should not be
applied to suppress evidence discovered in an improper search by law enforcement officers who reasonably and in good faith believed that their
actions were proper. 3
laws of the United States, if he has probable cause to believe that the person to be
arrested has committed or is committing a felony."
8. 622 F.2d at 834-35. Agent Markonni arrested the defendant for violation of the
Controlled Substance Act, 21 U.S.C. §801 (1976). The indictment contained two counts, one
for heroin found on the defendant's person and the other for heroin found in her luggage
in a search pursuant to a search warrant. The search warrant was issued by a federal
magistrate upon the agent's description of the defendant's prior conviction and the finding
of heroin on her person. 622 F.2d at 834-35.
9. 622 F.2d at 835. Defendant moved to have the evidence of the heroin found on her
person suppressed because the arrest to which the search was pursuant was unlawful. Defendant also moved to suppress the evidence of the heroin found in her luggage because
the search warrant was based, in critical part on information obtained pursuant to an
unlawful arrest. Id.
10. United States v. Williams, 594 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1979). Punishment for violation of a
bond condition is provided for by 18 U.S.C. §401(3) (1976): "A court of the United States
shall have power to punish by fine or imprisonment, at its discretion, such contempt of its
authority, and none other, as . .. (3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process,
order, rule, decree, or command." Also relevant to the punishment for violation of a bond
condition is 18 U.S.C. §3146(c) (1976) which provides: "A judicial officer authorizing the release of a person under this section shall issue an appropriate order containing a statement
of the conditions imposed, if any, shall inform such person of the penalties applicable to
violations of the conditions of his release and shall advise him that a warrant for his arrest
will be issued immediately upon any such violation."
11. United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1979) (rehearing en banc was
granted on the court's own mition).
12. There were two majority holdings in the instant case. Part I of the opinion
reversed the suppression of the evidence by statutory construction, holding that the agent
was duly authorized by statute to arrest the defendants. The first majority found, contrary
to the Fifth Circuit panel, that violation of the travel restrictions constituted criminal

contempt under 18 U.S.C. §401(3) (1976). See notes 3 & 10 supra. Therefore, the first majority held that the defendant had committed an offense against the United States for
which the agent was empowered to arrest under 21 U.S.C. §878(3) (1976). See note 7 supra.
This finding allowed the first majority to hold that the evidence was obtained by a search
incident to a lawful arrest. 622 F.2d at 639. The Part I opinion was written by Judge Politz
and concurred in by Chief Judge Coleman and Judges Godbold, Roney, Tjofiat, Rubin,

Kravitch, Frank M. Johnson, Jr., Garza, Henderson, Reavley, Hatchett, Anderson, Randall,
Tate, and Thomas A. Clark.
Part II of the opinion, the subject of this Comment, reversed the suppression of the
evidence by articulating a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. See note 13 and
accompanying text, infra.
13. 622 T.2d at 840. The Part II opinion was written by Judges Gee and Vance and
concurred in by Chief Judge Coleman and Judges Brown, Ainsworth, Charles Clark, Roney,
Tjofiat, Hill, Fay, Garza, Reavley, and Sam ). Johnson.
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Historically, the courts have balanced two interests in deciding whether
evidence obtained by law enforcement officers in an unreasonable search and
seizure should be excluded at trial. 1 4 The defendant's constitutional guarantees 15 have been weighed against society's need to be protected from crime.'
In a 1914 decision, Weeks v. United States,17 the Supreme Court made its first
significant choice between these concerns. The Court reasoned that because
the judiciary is charged with upholding the Constitution, courts cannot
sanction the use of unconstitutional means of evidence gathering by allowing
such evidence to be used at trial.' Consequently, the Court excluded evidence
illegally obtained by a federal officer.' 9
Although the decisions subsequent to Weeks were often narrow and inconsistent, the overall trend was to broaden the exclusionary rule's application. 20 In Wolf v. Colorado,21 the Supreme Court applied the fourth amendment to the states through the fourteenth amendment, but did not likewise

14. Miles, Decline of the Fourth Amendment: Time to Overrule Mapp v. Ohio?, 27
CATH.

U.L. Rv. 9, 73 (1977).

15. See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914) (if unconstitutionally seized
evidence can be used against the victim of the search at trial "the protection of the Fourth
Amendment . . . is of no value"). See notes 17-18 and accompanying text, infra. See
generally Kamisar, Is the Exclusionary Rule an "Illogical" or "Unnatural" Interpretation
of the Fourth Amendment?, 62 JUD. 66 (1978).
16. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 416 (1971)
(Burger, C. J., dissenting) (drawback of the exclusionary rule is "the high price it extracts
from society -the release of countless guilty criminals"); Alderman v. United States, 394
U.S. 165, 174-75 (1969) (standing to object to illegal seizures not expanded because of "the
public interest in prosecuting those accused of crime").
17. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
18. Id. at 392. "The tendency of those who execute criminal laws of the country
to obtain conviction by means of unlawful seizures and enforced confessions . . . should
find no sanction in the judgments of the courts, which are charged at all times with the
support of the Constitution." Id.
19. Id. at 398. In Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), a forerunner to Weeks, the
Supreme Court ruled that a law which required a defendant to produce his private books,
invoices, and papers violated the fourth and fifth amendments. Id. at 632. Both the procurement of the evidence by the district attorney and its admission in court were held to be
unconstitutional. Id. at 638. However, in Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904), the
Supreme Court allowed the admission of illegally seized evidence, holding that courts
will not inquire as to the source of competent evidence. Id. at 594. See generally Miles,
supra note 14; Sunderland, The Exclusionary Rule: A Requirement of Constitutional
Principle, 69 J. CRIM. L. 141 (1978).
20. In Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920), the Supreme Court
reviewed a district court opinion ordering federal agents to return papers seized illegally.
The agents had made copies of the papers before returning them and, using these copies,
had obtained subpoenas for the production of the originals. Id. at 391. The Supreme Court
rejected such indirect use of illegally seized evidence. Id. at 392. In Gouled v. United States,
255 U.S. 298 (1921), the Supreme Court held that a defendant can object to illegally seized
evidence at trial as well as before trial.
In Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), evidence from wiretapping was allowed.
After Congress made wiretapping illegal, however, such evidence was excluded. See Nardone
v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
21. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
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apply the exclusionary rule.2 2 Although recognizing that the rule served the
purpose of deterring fourth amendment violations, the court believed local
23
remedies could provide better deterrence.
Despite Wolf, significant expansion of the exclusionary rule occurred,
primarily through two decisions. In the 1960 decision of Elkins v. United
States,24 the Supreme Court held that evidence seized illegally by a state officer
could not be used in a federal court. Basing its decision on the deterrence
rationale,2 5 the Court reasoned that federal courts should not sanction illegal
state acts. 26 The use of such evidence was not attacked constitutionally;
rather, the rule was expanded under the Supreme Court's supervisory power
27
over the federal courts' formulation of rules of evidence.

In the 1961 decision of Mapp v. Ohio,28 the Supreme Court applied the
exclusionary rule to the states.- Unlike Elkins, the Court based this expansion
of the rule on constitutional grounds rather than on judge-made rules of
evidence. 0 The Court did not advance the concept of deterrence as a reason
81
for the rule's existence.
The expansion of the exclusionary rule stemmed from concern for the

individual's constitutional guarantees. 3 2 Nevertheless, cognizant that the sup22. Id. at 33.
23. Id. at 31-33. Justice Murphy in dissent strongly argued that the exclusionary rule
should have been applied to the states because it was the only effective means of deterrence.
Id. at 44. He also argued that it was equally important to apply the rule so that courts
would not participate in violations of the Constitution. Id. at 46. An important consideration
for the majority was that more than half of the states had not adopted the exclusionary rule.
Id. at 29.
24. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
25. Id. at 217. The Court believed that the exclusionary rule was the only effective
means of deterrence available. Xd. The Court noted that although factual proof of this
deterrence could probably not be assembled, the successful functioning of the federal
Bureau of Investigation under the rule was pragmatic supporting evidence. Id. at 218.
26. Id. at 222. The Court called this "the imperative of judicial integrity" and quoted
support from Justice Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1920):
"To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the end justified the means -to
declare that the government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private
criminal - would bring terrible retribution." 364 U.S. at 222-23.
27. 364 U.S. at 216.
28. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
29. Id. at 655. Justice Clark, who dissented in Elktins, wrote the plurality opinion in this
case. Four justices dissented.
30. Id. at 649. Of the five justices who supported applying the exclusionary rule to the
states, four considered the rule to be part of the fourth amendment, while Justice Black
believed that the fourth and fifth amendments taken together mandated the rule. Id. at 662.
Black's approach is similar to that of Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). See note
19 supra.
31. Although the Court referred to the exclusionary rule as a deterrent safeguard, it
applied the rule not as a remedial measure but as a Constitutional requirement. 367 U.S. at

648. In Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), however, the Supreme Court did emphasize the deterrent purpose of the rule when it decided not to apply Mapp retroactively. The
Court reasoned that retroactive application of the rule would have necessitated the retrying
or releasing of many prisoners, burdening the administration of justice. Id. at 637.
32. See notes 15, 18, 30 & 31 and text accompanying notes 17-19 &28-31 supra.
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pression of truth at trial helps the criminal,3 3 courts have relied on three
premises to create exceptions to the rule: that the exclusionary rule is 34a
judicially created rule of evidence, the main purpose of which is deterrence;
that the need for the rule in certain situations must be balanced against the
costs to society of its application;3 5 and that there is little need to exclude
evidence gained wrongfully but by reasonable, good faith actions.
Applying the first two of these premises, the Supreme Court has limited
standing to object to evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment.3 7 Moreover, the Court has utilized these premises to allow presentation
of illegally obtained evidence to grand juries35 and to restrict the availability
of federal habeas corpus relief for claims of unreasonable search and
seizure.as
33. See cases cited in note 16 supra. See also Wilkey, The Exclusionary Rule: Why
Suppress Valid Evidence?, 62 JUb. 214, 215 (1978) (discussing the "distressing rate of street
crimes . .. which flourish in no small degree simply because of the exclusionary rule of
evidence"). But see Canon, The Exclusionary Rule: Have Critics Proven that it Doesn't Deter
Police?, 62 JUa. 398, 399 (1979) ("Judge Wilkey's assertion that the incidence of crime is
related to the exclusionary rule fails to withstand even the most modest scrutiny.").
34. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482, 484 (1976); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433,
446 (1976); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974); United States v. Calandra, 414
U.S. 338, 348 (1974); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637 (1965); Elkins v. United States,
364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960). Whether the exclusionary rule actually deters violations of the
Constitution has been widely discussed. The Court in Janis commented that empirical studies
of deterrence are hampered by spotty record keeping prior to the Mapp decision and that
"each empirical study on the subject, in its own way, appears to be flawed." 428 U.S. at 449.
Instead of empirical evidence, the opinion stated, in evaluations of deterrence, the Supreme Court has relied on "its own assumption of human nature and the interrelationship
of the various components of the law enforcement system." Id. at 459. See generally Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349 (1974); Canon, supra
note 33; Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Cmi. L. REv. 665
(1970); Schlesinger, The Exclusionary Rule: Have Proponents Proven that it is a Deterrent
to Police?, 62 Jun. 404 (1979); Spiotto, Search and Seizure: An Empirical Study of the Exclusionary Rule and Its Alternatives, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 243 (1973).
35. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 492 (1976); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454
(1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349 (1974); Alderman v. United States, 394
U.S. 165, 174-75 (1969). Acceptance of the idea that the exclusionary rule is judicially created
instead of constitutionally required allows the use of this balancing analysis to limit the
exclusionary rule. If the rule were constitutionally required, it could not be limited by
practical concerns. Ball, Good Faith and the Fourth Amendment: The "Reasonable" Exception
to the Exclusionary Rule, 69 J. Cusm. L. 635, 650-51 (1978).
36. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 447, 458 n.35 (1976); Michigan v. Tucker, 417
U.S. 433, 447 (1974).
37. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969). The Alderman Court reasoned
that the deterrence produced by excluding evidence illegally seized from third parties would
not be great enough to justify diminishing the ability to prosecute and impairing the production of truth at trial. Id. at 174-75.
38. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974). The Calandra Court held that the
uncertain deterrence value of withholding illegally seized evidence from a grand jury did
not justify impairing the grand jury's function. Id. at 349.
39. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). The Stone Court held that federal collateral review of a state prisoner's illegal search and seizure claim would be confined to the question of
whether the state provided the prisoner a full and fair opportunity for an adjudication of
his claim. Id. at 481-82. The Court stated that the questionable deterrence value of federal
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Applying the last premise, the Supreme Court has excepted from the exclusionary rule evidence taken by law enforcement officers acting in reasonable good faith.40 In Michigan v. Tucker4' the Supreme Court refused to
exclude evidence indirectly gained from a suspect who was given only a
partial Miranda-type warning. 42 The interrogation involved came before the
Miranda decision, although the trial came afterwards. 3 As a partial justification for its decision, the Court indicated that the police had acted in complete
good faith, following the existing court rulings.&"

The good faith exception was also a factor in United States v. janis,45 in
which the Supreme Court allowed evidence seized by state officers with a defective search warrant to be used in a federal civil tax proceeding. The Court
allowed the evidence on the grounds that adequate deterrence was achieved
when the evidence was excluded from the state criminal proceeding 6 and
that the agents who obtained the evidence were acting in good faith.4 7
habeas corpus review of search and seizure claims was outweighed by its judicial costs. Td. at

494. This restriction of federal habeas corpus review was first advocated by Justice Powell
in his concurring opinion to Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 21, 950 (1973). See
Comment, Federal Habeas Corpus: A Major Step Toward Phasing Out the Exclusionary
Rule, 29 U. FLA. L. REV. 364, 374-75 (1977).
40. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 538 (1976) (White, J., dissenting). Justice White frlt
that the exclusionary rule was "a senseless obstacle to arriving at the truth in .many
criminal trials." Id. For other opinions favoring limitations on the exclusionary rule, see, e.g.,
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 496 (1976) (Burger, C. J., dissenting) (advocates drastic limitation on exclusionary rule); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 612 (Powell, J., concurring) (the
deterrence purpose of the exclusionary rule is only served when evidence gained by -willful
or negligent police conduct is excluded. When the police conduct is not of these types
there is no legitimate justification for withholding from the prosecution reliable and probable
evidence).
41. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
42. Id. at 436. The defendant in Tucker had been warned that he had a -right-to remain
silent and that evidence which he gave could be used against him.. He was asked if he wanted
an attorney and he said he did not. The warning did not meet the rquiremnts Pf ianda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), because the defendant was not told that goupsel would be
appointed for him if he was indigent. 417 U.S. at 436. After being given the warning the
defendant gave an alibi which led the police to a witness who testified against the defenldsnt
at trial. Id. at 437.
43. 417 U.S. at 435. The Miranda decision applied to all trials ocqwring After the ,4ate
of the decision. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
44. 417 U.S. at 447. The police fully complied with the requirements of Escobedo v.
Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), the law in force at the time the warnings were given to the
accused. 417 U.S. at 447. Significantly, only an indirect use was made of the defendant's
statements. 1d. at 449. In a concurring opinion, Justice Brennan, joined 'by Just.ice Marshail,
explained the resolution of the case in terms of the retroactivity of the Miranda.decisioju to
interrogations which took place before it. Brennan contended the refroacivity .of .Miranda
called only for the exclusion of directly incriminating statements from pre-Miranda-interrogations. Thus evidence indirectly gained from such interrogations as in T swker, .could b admitted. Id. at 458. See generally Ball, supra note 35, at 651-52.
45. 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
.46. Id. at 448.
47. Id. at -447, 458 n.35. The ,offices' reliance on the searrh -warrat Jinvolvel 'sapppnore4
their good faith. Id. at 434- 5.
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The influence of this line of Supreme Court cases can be seen in two Fifth
Circuit decisions. United States v. Hill 48 allowed the use at trial of evidence
seized under a search warrant that was based on an agent's insufficient affidavit.
The court expressly refused to apply the exclusionary rule because the agent
bolstered the insufficient affidavit by sworn testimony before the magistrate
49
who issued the warrant.
The Fifth Circuit held in United States v. Wolffs 5 that evidence obtained
by the unlawful collaboration of federal and state agents was properly admissible. The court did not apply the exclusionary rule because it considered
the violation of the Posse Comitatus Act,"' by a soldier and an army detective
5 2
helping a county sheriff make an arrest, to be an isolated, good faith mistake.
The instant case was resolved on two alternative grounds by two different
majorities. 5 3 In Part I of the opinion the first majority reversed the district
court's decision to suppress the evidence seized from defendant Williams. The
first majority interpreted the federal contempt statute 54 as authorizing the
federal agent to make a warrantless arrest for violation of a court ordered
travel restriction. 55 In Part II, a different majority56 reversed the district court's
suppression of the evidence by articulating a good faith exception to the ex57
clusionary rule.
In making this exception, the Part II majority emphasized that the exclusionary rule is not a requirement of the Constitution 5s but is a judicially
created rule for the purpose of deterrence. 59 The court's belief that the exclusion of evidence seized by police acting in reasonable good faith will not
deter police from violating fourth amendment guarantees 0 led the Part II
48. 500 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 931 (1975).
49. Id. at 320. The court found that the only error the agent and magistrate made was
a "technical one" in their procedure. Id. at 322.
50. 594 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1979).
51. The Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. §1385 (1976), provides that the military cannot
be used to enforce laws except when authorized by the Constitution or by an act of Congress.
The court did not decide whether this Act was violated. Rather the court deemed this a
complex and difficult issue, and held that even if the Act was violated, the evidence seized
was admissible. 594 F.2d at 85.
52. 594 F.2d at 85. The court stated that if confronted with repeated violations of the
Possee Comitatus Act in the future it could then fashion an exclusionary rule.
53. See note 12 supra.
54. See note 10 supra.
55. See note 3 supra.
56. See note 13 supra.
57. 622 F.2d at 840. The Part II majority did not address the question of statutory
construction as the Part I majority did. The second majority found the evidence involved
admissible regardless of whether the agent was authorized to arrest. Id. For evidence to be
admissible under this good faith exception, the court emphasized, a law enforcement agent's
actions had to be reasonable as well as in good faith. Id. at 841 n.4a.
58. Id. at 841-42.
59. Several recent Supreme Court cases stress this point. See note 34 and accompanying
text, supra.
60. 622 F.2d at 842. In support of this belief the court quoted from Justice White's
dissent in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 540 (1976): "When law enforcement personnel have
acted mistakenly, but in good faith and on reasonable grounds, and yet the evidence they
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majority to formulate the good faith exception.6' Following the Suprene
Court's reasoning62 in cases allowing illegally seized evidence to be used for
impeachment-3 and before a grand jury," the Part II majority balanced the
advantages of applying the rule in this situation with the disadvantages.6 5 For
this majority, suppression of the truth at trial 6 and the release into society
of a convicted drug smugglere 7 outweighed the small likelihood of deterrence.68
The good faith exception carved out by the Part II majority contained
two facets. 6 9 The first, which the court termed a technical violation, raised an
exception to the exclusionary rule when a law enforcement officer relied on
a statute which was later ruled unconstitutional, a reasonable interpretation
of a statute which was construed differently, a warrant which was later invalidated, or a court precedent which was later overruled.7 0 In the instant
case, the drug enforcement agent, having the power to make warrantless
arrests for federal offenses committed in his presence, arrested the defendant
for violating the travel restrictions of her release pending appeal. The government contended in its brief to the panel that a violation of travel restrictions
imposed by the court when granting release pending appeal, was an act of
criminal contempt. 71 The panel, however, construed the statute to empower
the court, not a DEA agent, to punish contempt. According to the panel,
therefore, the arrest was not valid. 72 The instant court reversed the panel
and held the arrest to be lawful. The reasoning behind this technical exception
is that law enforcement agents cannot be expected to forecast how later
73
courts will construe the statute on which they relied.
have seized is later excluded, the exclusion can have no deterrent effect. The officers, if
they do their duty, will act in similar fashion in similar circumstances in the future." 622
F.2d at 842. One writer has taken the position that the balancing analysis used by the
Supreme Court in recent exclusionary rule cases itself creates a good faith exception. Comment,
FourthAmendment in the Balance- The Exclusionary Rule After Stone v. Powell, 28 BAYLOR
L. REV. 611, 625 (1976).
61. 622 F.2d at 840.
62. See notes 37-39 and accompanying text, supra.
63. 622 F.2d at 842-43. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
64. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
65. 622 F.2d at 840, 842.
66. Id. at 842.
67. Id. at 840. Defendant Williams had a prior conviction for possession of heroin.
Id. at 833.
68. Id. at 840.
69. The court adopted this analysis from Ball, supranote 35, at 635.
70. 622 F.2d at 840-41.

71.

18 U.S.C. §401(3) (1976).

72. 622 F.2d at 836.
73. Id. at 843. Supreme Court cases cited by the second majority in support of the
technical violation facet were Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979) (evidence seized in a
good faith arrest for violation of a law later declared unconstitutional held admissible);
United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975) (evidence seized in a good faith border search
in reliance on judicial approval of a reasonable distance for such searches being one hundred
miles from border held admissible even though that definition of reasonable distance was
later overturned). Fifth circuit decisions cited by the court included United States v. Cardena,
529 F.R1 443 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 848 (1976), modified on other. grounds sub
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The second facet of the good faith exception recognized by the Part II
majority applied when a law enforcement officer makes a judgmental error
concerning the existence of facts sufficient to constitute probable cause for a
search or arrest.7 4 The court termed this the good faith mistake facet of the

exception.75 Authoritative support for the good faith mistake exception to the
exclusionary rule was found in the Janis court's 76 refusal to exclude evidence

obtained in good faith reliance on a defective search warrant;77 in the Tucker
court's7 8 refusal to exclude testimony of the accused made during a police interrogation administered in good faith after only partial Miranda warnings;79
in the Hill court's 0 refusal to exclude evidence obtained through the use of
a search warrant issued in good faith on an insufficient affidavit; s and finally
in the Wolff court's8

2

refusal to exclude evidence obtained by the unlawful

collaboration of federal and state agents on the grounds that the agents had
made an isolated, good faith mistake when they violated the statute in
question. 3
The Part II majority concluded that where the reason for the exclusionary
rule ceases, the rule should also cease. The price of deliberate suppression of
truth at a trial is too high a price to pay when no deterrence can be had. Thus
this majority urges that the Fifth Circuit no longer exclude evidence because
of police conduct, even if the conduct is mistaken or unauthorized, if the
84
conduct was taken in the reasonable, good faith belief that it was proper.
noin., United States v. Ashley, 569 F.2d 975, 979 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 853 (1978)
(evidence seized in a good faith arrest and search under a statute later declared invalid was
admissible); United States v. Kilgen, 445 F.2d 287 (5th Cir. 1971) (evidence seized in a good
faith arrest under a vagrancy statute later declared unconstitutional was admissible).
74. 622 F.2d at 841.
75. Id.
76. 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
77. 622 F.2d at 845. See notes 45-67 and accompanying text, supra.
78. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
79. 622 F.2d at 845. See notes 40-44 and accompanying text, supra. The second majority
quoted from Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, to support its position: "The deterrent
purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the police have engaged in willful,
or at the very least negligent, conduct which has deprived the defendant of some right. . . .
Where the official action was pursued in complete good faith, however, the deterrence
rationale loses much of its force." Id. at 447.
80. 500 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 931 (1975).
81. 622 F.2d at 845. See notes 48-49 and accompanying text, supra.
82. 594 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1979).
83. 622 F.2d at 845-46. See notes 50-52 and accompanying text, supra.
84. 622 F.2d at 847. The second majority held that the arresting agent in the instant
case acted in a good faith belief that Williams' conduct violated 18 U.S.C. §3146 (1976) and
that the agent's belief was reasonable. Id. Because of this, the court found that the instant
case presented "a good-faith 'technical violation,' an action under a reasonable interpretation of the arrest power under section 3146 that was subsequently reconstrued by our
panel." Id. The second majority spoke in terms of the arrest power granted by 18 U.S.C.
§3146 (1976), see note 3 supra, which provides for the imposition of travel restrictions. 622
F.2d at 846. The statute that the first majority interpreted as authorizing the agent to arrest
was 18 U.S.C. §401(3) (1976), which authorizes punishment for contempt of court. 622 F.2d
at 839. See note 10 supra.
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In a special concurrence,85 Judge Rubins6 accepted the Part I interpretation of the federal contempt statute as authorizing Williams' arrest, thus finding
it unnecessary to deal with the constitutional issue of exceptions to the exclusionary rule. 87 Accusing the Part II majority of grasping for a means to
change a long line of precedent,88 Judge Rubin criticized its authors for failing
to cite any direct precedent for their positions9 and for failing to deal with the
Supreme Court's position, stated in Weeks and other cases90 that the exclusionary rule was mandated by the Constitution.
In contrast, Judge Hill,9 ' concurring with the Part II majority, 92 contended
that Judge Rubin mistakenly criticized the Part II majority for considering an
inappropriate issue.93 He reasoned that because the Part II majority resolved
the case on grounds of the exclusionary rule's applicability, and because the
exclusionary rule is a judicially created rule governing the admissibility of
evidence, no constitutional question was reached 4
The Part II majority's failure to deal with the constitutional issue is subject
to challenge. The majority reasoned that the only purpose for the exclusionary
rule is deterrence. 5 Thus, it is a judge-made rule crafted to enforce constitutional requirements and not itself a requirement of the Constitution. 8 The
85. 622 F.2d at 848.
86. Concurring with Judge Rubin were Judges Godbold, Kravitch, Johnson, Politz,
Hatchett, Anderson, Randall, Tate, and Clark.
87. Id. Judge Rubin charged that the Part II majority had dealt with a pure hypothetical
and that judicial self-restraint dictated the avoidance of constitutional issues when a case
is settled on other grounds. Id.
88. Id. at 848 (quoting Crist v. Cline, 434 U.S. 980, 981 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
89. Id. at 849.
90. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). See also United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 355 (1971)
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
91. Concurring with Judge Hill was Judge Fay. 622 F.-2d at 847.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 847.
94. Id. "[Judge Rubin] suggests that because a majority can resolve the issue before us
(admissibility of the evidence vel non) by deciding the constitutionality of the search, we
should not address the admissibility of the evidence on other grounds. I believe the order
of address is the other way around. If we find the evidence admissible without regard to the
constitutional question, we should decline to reach and decide the latter." Id. Judge Hill
also defended the exception made by the second majority by saying that it was better to
admit evidence by making an exception to the exclusionary rule than be tempted to admit
the evidence by cutting back the fourth amendment to make a certain search constitutional.
Id.
95. Id. at 841-42.
96. Id. at 841, 847. Commentators have taken both sides of the question of whether
the exclusionary rule is part of the Constitution. See generally Kamisar, The Exclusionary
Rule in HistoricalPerspective: The Struggle to Make the Fourth Amendment More Than an
Empty Blessing, 62 Jun. 336 (1979); Kamisar, supra note 15; Miles, supra note 14; Wilkey,
supra note 33. One commentator has argued that the exclusionary rule is mandated by the
due process clause of the fifth amendment because the use of evidence gained through
violation of a constitutional guarantee in a trial means that that trial is not providing due
process of law. Sunderland, supra note 19, at 148-50. Another commentator has suggested that
unless the exclusionary rule is a constitutional right, the validity of its imposition on the
states as a remedial rule is questionable. Ball, supra note 35, at 650. It has also been
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Supreme Court decisions which created the exclusionary rule, and extended it
to the states, however, regarded it as being mandated by the Constitution.9
Despite the Supreme Courts recent emphasis on the deterrence rationale,"
the Weeks court, 99 which formulated the exclusionary rule, held that the rule's
purpose was prevention of judicial complicity in violations of the Constitu°
tion. 0°
Even the Part II majority in the instant case recognized that the
application of the exclusionary rule is triggered by a violation of the Constitution.10 1
Another infirmity of the Part II opinion is that the exception it formulated
was broader than the authority cited for its support. Although ample support
was provided for the technical violation facet of the good faith exception, 1 2
no direct precedent was cited for the good faith mistake facet.0 8 The four
cases cited by the Part II majority in support of this exception can be distinguished from the instant facts because none dealt with the officer's own
mistaken perception of probable cause. In both Janis and Hill, officers relied
upon defective warrants. 0 4 In Tucker the police relied upon existing judicial
standards of the warnings to be given an accused. 0 5 In Wolffs the good faith
exception was employed not because the agents made a mistake in their perception of probable cause, but because the violation of the pertinent statute
was an isolated incident committed in good faith. 10
In addition, the good faith mistake that the Part II majority attributed to
the agent is unclear.107 That majority characterized the agent's good faith mistake as a factual error about an element of the crime of violating a travel restriction.""8 This factual basis would have existed, however, only if the agent
made an error in perceiving the facts relevant to probable cause. This did not
occur; the agent correctly made the only perception necessary, that Williams
argued that the Supreme Court's imposition of remedial rules not required by the Constitution is judicial legislation. Yackle, The Burger Court and the Fourth Amendment, 26 U. KA.
L. RE:v. 335, 425 (1978).
97. See notes 15, 18, 30 & 31 and text accompanying notes 17-19 & 28-31 supra.
98. See, e.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976); United States v. Calandra,
414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974).
99. 232 U.S. at 392. See notes 15 & 18 and text accompanying notes 17-19, supra. Subsequent decisions have asserted the same purpose for the rule. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. at 648-49; Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. at 220, 222; Silverthorne Lumber Co. v.
United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920). See notes 26, 30 & 31 and accompanying text, supra.
100. See Sunderland, supra note 19, at 143; Comment, supra note 60, at 621.
101. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (if a case can
be decided on constitutional grounds or by statutory construction, it should be decided by
the latter). Interestingly, Ashwander was the case relied upon by Judge Hill to support his
contention that the second majority was correct in deciding the case by the exclusionary
rule exception. 622 F.2d at 847.
102. See note 73 supra.
103. 622 F.2d at 849.
104. See notes 45-49 and accompanying text, supra.
105. See notes 40-44 and accompanying text, supra.
106. See notes 50-52 and accompanying text, supra.
107. 622 F.2d at 846. See notes 84-85 supra.
108. 622 F.2d at 846.
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was somewhere other than the state to which she -was restricted by court
order. 09
Had the Part II majority limited its exclusionary rule exception to technical
violations, which under the facts of the instant case and supporting authority
would have been appropriate,1 ° the dangers in this decision might have been
avoided. A technical violation, almost by definition, assures that an officer
acted in reasonable good faith."' The good faith and reasonableness of the
officer are objectively demonstrated by his reliance on a statute or other
authority. The good faith mistake facet of the exception articulated by the
Part II majority, however, does not lend itself to such assurances of reasonableness and good faith. Instead, it creates opportunity for abuse at two levels.
First, a law enforcement officer who has knowingly made an unlawful arrest
or search may later claim that he was acting in good faith." 2 Second, the
court deciding such good faith claims has wide discretion in applying the
exclusionary rule." 3 The potential for abuse is heightened by the Part H
majority's failure to fashion a test for the establishment of reasonable good
faith and failure to articulate the burden of proof." 4
In articulating the good faith exception, the Part II majority followed
a trend towards limiting the exclusionary rule because of its high price to
society- 5 The continuation of a trend, however, does not make a decision
correct. Weeks and its progeny formulated the exclusionary rule out of concern
for individual rights guaranteed by the Constitution." 6 This concern was
forgotten by the instant court, which broadened the exception to the exclusionary rule despite facts which did not warrant the broad exception," 7 weak
109. Id. at 840. It may be argued that the agents good faith mistake occurred in his
incorrect perception of Williams as a criminal. Since the agent's perception of Williams as a

criminal, was caused by the agent's reliance on the contempt statute, the mistake is a
technical violation.
110.
111.
112.
Brennan

See note 72 and text accompanying note 102 supra.
Ball, supra note 35, af656.
See United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 560 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice
also argued that having to investigate the subjective states of mind of police and

the reasonable objective inferences which could be drawn from laws would add an extra
burden to already heavily burdened courts. Id.
113. For examples of negative reactions to the exclusionary rule see generally Stone
v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 476 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring); Bivens v. Six Unknown
Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 412 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Wilkey,

supra note 33.
114. 622 F.2d at 847. In addition to the danger of arbitrary application, this exception
could diminish one incentive of law enforcement agencies to properly train and supervise
their officers. See Ball, supra note 35, 656. In a situation which an officer could interpret as

either presenting or not presenting probable cause for a search or arrest, a good faith exception would allow an officer to invariably choose the interpretation which least respects an
individual's constitutional rights. United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 559 (1975) (Brennan,
J., dissenting). See Bain & Kelly, Fruit of the Poisonous Tree: Recent Development as
Viewed Through Its Exceptions, 31 U. MIrAMi L. REv. 615, 650 (1977); Kamisar, supra note
15; at 84 n.112; Yackle, supra note 100, at 426.
115. See text accompanying note 33 supra.

116. See text accompanying notes 18 &30 supra.
117. See notes 107-109 and accompanying text, supra.
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supporting authority, and the availability of more appropriate grounds for the
decision. 118
THOMAS TIHE
118.

See note 101 and accompanying text, supra.
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